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Abstract 
 
This paper develops a conceptual framework that allows for a consistent and coherent 
treatment of knowledge spillovers from FDI. In this framework, three aspects play a crucial 
role. First, FDI is a general notion that actually comprises a host of different investment types. 
Second, the number and nature of the knowledge spillover transfer channels differs per type 
of FDI. Third, the fact that knowledge spillovers only accrue when there is a sufficient 
absorptive capacity in the host country. Confronting empirical research on knowledge 
spillovers with these observations reveals that they have largely been ignored. We argue that 
this is the reason for the extremely mixed evidence on knowledge spillovers, and that the 
empirical research strategy should be altered in order to take proper account of theoretical 
notions.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Many national governments believe that luring Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) into their 
economies will have substantial positive economic effects. Aside from direct effects (e.g. a 
rise in employment), increased attention has been directed towards the existence of knowledge 
spillovers. A large literature on knowledge spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
has subsequently emerged, both theoretically (e.g. Romer, 1990; Grossman and Helpman, 
1991) as well as empirically (see e.g. Cincera and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2001; 
Saggi, 2002; Keller, 2004). Conceptual grounds on which these knowledge spillovers are 
believed to occur appear intuitively plausible, but empirical research has presented ambiguous 
evidence. This also applies to evidence concerning the alleged spatial nature of knowledge 
spillovers. The efforts of many countries to attract FDIs, validated by the existence of 
knowledge spillovers, are thus questionable (see e.g. Blomström and Kokko, 2003). 
In this paper we develop a conceptual framework that allows for a consistent and 
coherent treatment of knowledge spillovers from FDI. In our framework three aspects play a 
crucial role. First, FDI is a general notion that actually comprises a host of different 
investment types, where investment types are distinguished mainly by degree of ownership. 
Second, the number and nature of the knowledge spillover transfer channels differs per type 
of FDI. In fact, as we will show a hump-back shaped relation between ownership and 
spillover potential will generally appear. This implies that an interesting paradox arises. 
Whereas the prime reason for firms to undertake FDI is to keep crucial, firm-specific 
knowledge within the boundaries of the firm, at the same time the inclination to increase the 
level of ownership goes up when more firm-specific knowledge is at hand. The paradox is 
then that an increase in (firm-specific) knowledge increases the incentive to organize at a 
higher level of integration (in order to prevent knowledge from spilling over), which in turn 
increases the potential for knowledge spillovers given the large degree of (firm-specific) 
knowledge that has crossed national borders. The third aspect to consider is that spillover 
potential of FDI on the one hand and actual spillovers on the other are two very distinct 
concepts. Whereas the former relates mainly to the two aspects mentioned above, the latter 
has to do with the absorptive capacity of the recipient country. We will refer to this as the 
technological distance between the investor and the recipient. 
To yield further analytical insight on these matters, we also formalize our conceptual 
framework into a model of knowledge spillovers and FDI. When we confront our theoretical 
framework with the empirical literature on FDI-related knowledge spillovers, we find that the 
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fundamental problem with this literature is that it has by and large ignored theoretical 
concepts.1 Specifically, most previous empirical modeling efforts have disregarded the fact 
that FDI covers a wide variety of different investment types. We therefore also discuss the 
consequences of our conceptual framework for the empirical modeling of knowledge 
spillovers by FDI. As these are many, we conclude by presenting a strategy how to sensibly 
validate the empirical relation between FDI and knowledge spillovers. 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses taxonomies 
and conditions for knowledge spillovers. Section 3 specifically deals with FDI-related 
knowledge spillovers and develops our conceptual framework. In section 4 we present a 
formalization of this framework and derive analytical insights as to the relation between 
(types of) FDI and knowledge spillovers. Section 5 confronts the empirical research on 
knowledge spillovers with our framework. Section 6 concludes and presents our agenda for 
further research. 
 
2. Taxonomies and conditions for knowledge spillovers 
 
The fact that knowledge can spill over from one country, industry or firm to another is due to 
the public good nature of knowledge, as first recognized by Arrow (1962) and later 
extensively discussed by e.g. Keller (2001) and Blomström and Kokko (2003). The non-
rivalry and non-exclusivity of knowledge invoke free-riding behavior, i.e. parties other than 
the innovator may be able to costlessly benefit from the innovation, so that the actual 
innovator may not be able to fully appropriate all the rents originating from his innovation. 
Yet it is also exactly this characteristic of knowledge that is often used to validate government 
intervention, as it implies that the social returns of innovation may be higher than the private 
returns.  
 Previous literature provides a host of possible taxonomies according to which 
knowledge spillovers can be classified. Grilliches (1979) talks about innovation externalities 
and distinguishes between knowledge spillovers on the one hand and rent spillovers on the 
other, the latter resulting from imperfect price-adjustments following quality improvements of 
goods and services (also see Cincera and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001)). Grünfeld 
(2002a) differentiates between embodied versus disembodied knowledge spillovers, where the 
former are mainly related to tangibles (e.g. goods) and the latter to intangibles (e.g. services). 
                                                
1
 Grossman and Helpman (1990) and Hoppe (2005) make a similar point, be it in a different context. 
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Keller (2001) adheres to a somewhat similar taxonomy of active versus passive knowledge 
spillovers, although he bases this classification mainly on spillover transfer mechanisms: 
(international) trade, FDI, personal communication patterns, articles in (scientific) journals 
and patents (Keller, 2001;2004). Accordingly, spillovers are termed active when they provide 
the receiver with a kind of "blueprint" of the knowledge (e.g. patents), whereas they are 
termed passive when it allows the receiver only to apply certain pre-designed elements of the 
knowledge or technology (e.g. trade in intermediate goods).  Note that these spillover 
mechanisms point out that knowledge spillovers can be both national as well as international 
in scope. 
Although these transfer mechanisms thus provide very general vehicles for 
knowledge, it is possible to identify more specific transfer channels that can in turn be related 
to the transfer mechanisms. With respect to FDI for instance, Saggi (2002) presents three 
transfer channels that are specifically related to FDI: (1) Demonstration effects, which may 
lead to reverse engineering and imitation, (2) Labor turnover, which means that workers 
employed by the Multinational Enterprise (MNE) undertaking the FDI may switch jobs and 
hence take with them firm-specific knowledge, and (3) Vertical linkages, which means that 
the MNE may transfer knowledge or technology to its suppliers of intermediate goods 
(upstream linkages) or its customers (downstream linkages).2 Other authors have introduced 
some other possible spillover channels (e.g. Blomström and Kokko, 2003; Grünfeld, 2002a), 
but the three identified by Saggi are generally considered to be the most important. 3 
Moreover, demonstration effects are not solely related to FDI, but can be bound up with other 
mechanisms as well, for instance with trade. Furthermore, Grossman and Helpman (1991) 
argue that communication is an important transfer channel for trade as well. 
Although knowledge may spill over from one end, we still have to consider the other 
end of the channel: the knowledge-receiving party. For it is not immediately obvious that 
knowledge will also be received automatically once it spills over. Cohen and Levinthal (1989) 
were one of the first to address this issue. Consider the following function governing a firm's 
(i) stock of technological and scientific knowledge (zi): 
 
    )( ∑
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2
 Usually, downstream linkages imply that the MNE is itself in fact a producer of intermediate goods and its 
customers are hence other firms in stead of (private) consumers. 
3
 For more variations on vertical (backward) linkages as well as specific examples, see e.g. United Nations 
(2001), Chapter 4. 
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Here, M denotes investment in Research and Development (R&D), θ  represents the degree of 
intra-industry spillovers and T is the level of extra-industry knowledge. The variable of 
interest is γ, which denotes the fraction of knowledge in the public domain that the firm is 
able to assimilate and exploit. The authors define γ  to be a firm's absorptive capacity, which 
is in turn governed by: 
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In [2], the variable β reflects certain characteristics of outside knowledge. The point to note 
here is that absorptive capacity is also positively dependent on the firm's own investments in 
R&D (although decreasingly so). Hence we observe a direct positive influence of investments 
in R&D from [1], as well as an indirect positive influence from [2] since more investment in 
R&D also allow the firm to better exploit external knowledge.4 Authors such as Lankhuizen 
(1998), Keller (2001) and Grünfeld (2002b;2003) have subsequently substantiated this claim 
empirically. They have also noted that human capital may be another determinant of 
absorptive capacity.5 
 Although important, absorptive capacity alone may not be enough to absorb 
knowledge spillovers. A growing strand of literature has been arguing that geography matters 
for knowledge spillovers as well (e.g. Audretsch and Feldman, 2003; Jaffe et al., 1993; 
Asheim and Gertler, 2005). According to this view, it is important to be spatially located near 
to the source of knowledge spillovers.6 Authors like Girma and Wakelin (2001) have argued 
that some of the distinguished spillover transfer channels are somewhat geographically 
bounded.7 However, the primary reason for the relevance of location addressed in the 
                                                
4
 The authors work out this model more extensively and show that the common proposition that increasing 
spillovers reduce the incentive to invest in R&D is not straightforwardly applicable in their model due to the 
offsetting direct and indirect effects of R&D.  
5
 An interesting paper specifically with regard to the absorptive capacity function of human capital is by 
Acemoglu and Zilibotti (2001).  These authors show that even if two countries have access to exactly the same 
technologies and are different only in (labor-)skill composition, still large productivity differences may arise 
because of technology-skill mismatch. 
6
 We would like to point out the similarity between the absorptive capacity discussion and the issues surrounding 
geography by noting that the former relates to technological (technical) distance between two firms, whereas the 
latter relates to spatial distance. 
7
 For instance, the authors argue that labor is more mobile within than between regions, which implies that labor 
turnover as a transfer channel for knowledge is spatially bounded. 
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literature relates to the tacit nature of knowledge, which requires some kind of face-to-face 
interaction in order to be properly transferred from the sender to the receiver.   
In very general terms, the literature distinguishes between codified knowledge and 
tacit knowledge (see e.g. Powell and Grodal, 2005). Codified knowledge is preserved in a 
more tangible form (such as books, CD-Roms, data-files etc.) whereas tacit knowledge is 
preserved in intangibles (such as experience, routines, norms etc.). It is possible to relate these 
different types of knowledge to different transfer mechanisms and channels, and to the 
relevance of geography. This is done in Table 1 below. 
 A glance at the table reveals several things: first of all, there seems to be no 
straightforward relationship between (dis)embodied and active/passive spillovers. This also 
goes for the relationship between classifications of spillovers and the involved types of 
knowledge. Furthermore, location indeed matters mainly for spillover mechanisms that 
incorporate some degree of tacit knowledge. The table also hints to the fact that FDI 
comprises an interesting mix of spillover transfer channels, types of knowledge and spatiality. 
This is also the prime reason for the focus on FDI in this paper.  
 
Transfer 
mechanism 
Transfer 
channel(s) 
Classification Involved 
Knowledge 
Geographical 
relevance 
Trade a -demonstration 
effects 
b -communication 
a -embodied/passive 
b -disembodied/active 
A -codified 
b -tacit 
Relevant/Irrelevant 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
a -demonstration 
effects 
b -labor turnover 
c -vertical linkages 
a -(dis)embodied/passive 
b -disembodied/active 
c -(dis)embodied/passive 
a -codified/tacit 
b -tacit 
c -codified/tacit 
Relevant 
Communication 
Patterns 
a -communication  a -disembodied/active a -tacit Relevant 
Articles in 
(scientific) 
journals 
a -demonstration 
effects 
a -embodied/active a -codified Irrelevant 
Patents a -demonstration 
effects 
a -embodied/active  a -codified  Irrelevant 
Table 1: Knowledge spillover taxonomies 
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3. FDI and knowledge spillovers: a paradox 
 
A well-established theoretical framework of the MNE is Dunning’s (1977) OLI-paradigm. 
The OLI-paradigm argues that there are three main motives to undertake FDI which are 
related to ownership-, location- and/or internalization advantages.8 Hence one reason for a 
firm to engage in FDI in stead of international trade is when it has a critical degree of firm-
specific knowledge attached to its activities. In this way, the firm is able to better control the 
application of this knowledge and to prevent it from spilling over.9 This view thus assumes 
that knowledge can spill over through international trade, but not through FDI. However, in 
the previous section we have argued that FDI may very well function as a spillover 
mechanism for knowledge, albeit relying on different (or even more) transfer channels than 
international trade (Table1). Here a paradox presents itself: An increase in (firm-specific) 
knowledge increases incentives for FDI in order to prevent knowledge from spilling over, 
which in turn may actually serve to increase spillover potential given the large degree of 
(firm-specific) knowledge.10 We will refer to this paradox as the OLI-paradox. 
 It is evident that the OLI-paradox hinges crucially on the assumption that FDI 
functions as a knowledge spillover mechanism. Referring back to Table 1, the spillover 
potential of FDI is largely determined by the specific spillover transfer channels. These 
transfer channels are therefore of prime importance for substantiating the OLI-paradox, or 
more generally, for testing the spillover potential of FDI. Specifically, we can distinguish two 
effects that are helpful in analyzing the OLI-paradox. 
First of all, the relevance of distinguishing specific transfer channels becomes (even 
more) evident when we recognize that FDI is mainly a theoretical notion (see e.g. Lipsey, 
2001). It actually comprises various types of foreign investment. Van Marrewijk (2002) 
shows that classifying and sub-classifying FDI can lead to a host of different types of FDI, 
many of which are characterized by different degrees of ownership.11  As it turns out, this 
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 The validity of OLI-motives for FDI have also been empirically substantiated (see e.g. Brouthers et al. 1999; 
Arora and Fosfuri, 2000). 
9
 Markusen and Venables (1998) construct a more formal model of the development of FDI. These authors show 
that MNEs are more likely to arise when (1) overall markets are large, (2) different national markets are similar 
in size and factor rewards, (3) firm-level scale economies are large relative to plant-level scale economies and 
(4) transport costs are high.  
10
 Later on in this paper, we will argue that it is the relative knowledge intensity of the FDI that matters for 
spillover potential. For the moment however, the presented intuition should suffice. 
11
 Principally, van Marrewijk makes a distinction between Greenfield FDI, Mergers and Acquisitions. The latter 
may be subdivided in full, majority and minority acquisitions. 
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observation is very important for our analysis. Hence we will officially term it the level of 
control-effect and refer to it as such henceforth. 
The second effect is closely related to the fist one. Ethier and Markusen (1996) 
construct a formal two-country, two-period model in order to analyze a firm's choice of how 
to service a foreign market. The options range from exporting, to a combination of licensing 
and exporting to setting up a fully-owned subsidiary. The authors show that a firm’s choice 
for a specific type of FDI depends on, inter alia, the importance of knowledge capital relative 
to physical capital.12 From their discussion it follows that different types of FDI are likely to 
have different spillover potentials. Let us illustrate this argument by means of an example, 
presented in Table 2 below. The table combines three different types of FDI (different mainly 
in the degree of ownership) with the three spillover transfer channels from Table 1.  
 
 
 Licensing Joint Venture  Full Ownership 
Demonstration 
Effects 
X X  
Labor  
Turnover 
 X X 
Vertical  
Linkages 
X X  
Table 2: Combining different types of FDI with spillover channels 
 
A cross-mark denotes that a transfer channel is relevant for a specific type of FDI. For 
example, a wholly owned subsidiary may not provide strong spillover effects through 
demonstration effects as most of the knowledge is kept internal to the firm. However, when 
the subsidiary hires and trains local personnel, another transfer channel presents itself: labor 
turnover. In time, some of the personnel may leave the MNE's subsidiary and find work 
elsewhere, so that knowledge is transferred. A joint venture possibly presents the highest 
potential for knowledge to spill over: the MNE brings in firm specific knowledge which 
induces demonstration effects to the partner firm, it may train local personnel which in time 
can lead to spillovers through labor turnover, and finally it may spill over knowledge to the 
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 It should be noted that other conditions apply to this decision as well, e.g. the applied profit discounting factor 
and trade (export) costs. An interesting feature of the model is moreover that potential foreign partner firms are 
able to exploit the newly acquired knowledge in the second period, thus posing a competitive threat to the 
original inventor. 
Ownership +  
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(already established) supplier- and buyer-network of the partner firm.13 This establishes the 
second effect, which we will henceforth refer to as the channel variety-effect. It establishes 
that specific transfer channels have different impacts on different types of FDI, as well as that 
some types of FDI may have a greater variety of transfer channels ‘available’ than do other 
types. Both the level of control-effect and the channel variety-effect play a crucial role in 
explaining the OLI-paradox, to which we will now turn. 
 The OLI-paradigm holds that, inter alia, more firm specific knowledge leads to a 
preference of FDI over exports. This paradigm is based on the belief that exports suffer from 
spillover potential whereas FDIs do not. Based on the discussion in section 2 we already 
know that this belief is probably false. However, let us reason along the lines of the OLI- 
paradigm for the moment in order to clarify our argument. 
 
 
Figure 1: The OLI-paradigm  
 
Figure 1 denotes the mechanisms underlying the OLI-paradigm. Figure 1a denotes the alleged 
relationship between spillover potential and degree of ownership (integration)14. Note that 
exporting implies the lowest possible degree of integration. Accordingly, the OLI-paradigm 
states that exports incorporate the highest spillover potential. Hence if there is a high degree 
of firm-specific knowledge embodied in production, exporting is too risky and a firm should 
                                                
13
 Note that the table implies a rather short time horizon, since even a wholly owned subsidiary will develop 
long-term supplier- and customer-relationships over time. However, it may take a while before such 
relationships are well established so that the relationship may be of an arms-length nature at first and vertical 
linkages are not immediately established. 
14
 We follow the common practice where a higher degree of integrations denotes more ownership. 
Integration Integration 
K' 
Spillover 
Potential 
a b
(Transferred) 
Knowledge 
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in stead choose to produce abroad. The reason for this is that in this case there is no spillover 
potential. From Table 1 we observe that the main spillover transfer channel for trade is 
demonstration effects. According to Table 2, the only type of FDI that is not plagued by 
demonstration effects is fully integrated FDI. We should thus recognize that the OLI-
paradigm implicitly refers only to fully owned types of FDI (i.e. degree of integration = 1, 
which relates to 0 spillover potential in Figure 1a). It thus appears as if the OLI-paradigm 
only considers the bold endpoints of the Figure 1a, by only considering demonstration effects 
as a valid transfer channel.  
 Figure 1b accordingly shows the relationship between the amount of firm specific 
knowledge (transferred abroad) and integration. The OLI-paradigm states that when firm 
specific knowledge surpasses a certain threshold (say K'), a firm should decide to produce 
abroad in stead of export. However, we just stated that the OLI-paradigm appears to only 
consider endpoints, so that producing abroad means engaging in a fully-owned type of FDI. 
Accordingly, the relationship between knowledge and ownership cannot be continuous, but 
instead is dichotomous, as shown in the right graph by the two bold lines, connected by the 
thin grey line (at which the function is thus not valued).  
 One obvious objection to our reasoning along the lines of the OLI-paradigm thus far, 
is that by only considering exports on the one hand and fully owned FDI on the other we are 
disregarding the level of control-effect. I.e. a firm can also choose to cooperate with a foreign 
firm when engaging in FDI, choices ranging along a continuum of degrees of integration. 
Note that allowing for the level of control-effect appears to leave the OLI-paradigm intact at 
first sight. For the figures displayed above allow for a continuum of different types of FDI 
since there can exist continuous negative (positive) relationships between ownership and 
spillover potential (transferred knowledge), as displayed by the dashed lines.15  
 However, we have shown by means of the simple example in Table 2 that different 
types of FDI are related to different types and numbers of spillover transfer channels through 
the channel variety-effect. Hence, if we allow both for the level of control-effect and the 
channel variety-effect, the relationship between spillover potential and degree of ownership 
changes dramatically from the one shown in Figure 1a. More specifically, if for the moment 
we attach equal weights to the transfer channels, we are able to express spillover potential of 
each type of FDI in terms of number of transfer channels only. As our simple example in 
                                                
15
 Such relationships are suggested by e.g. Hill et al. (1990) and Dimelis and Louri (2002) 
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Table 2 already shows, this is relationship is not monotone. In fact, it looks more like an 
inverted U, such as the SS-curve in Figure 2 below.  
 
 
Figure 2: The OLI-paradox 
 
Thus we now obtain a hump-back shaped relationship between spillover potential and 
ownership, which reaches a maximum at say I'. For values of I> I' the relationship is indeed 
negative, albeit not linearly so. Still, since this is what the OLI-paradigm implies, we can state 
that after a certain degree of ownership I' the OLI-paradigm holds. However, for all degrees 
of ownership I<I', we actually observe a positive relationship between ownership and 
spillover potential, which is exactly the opposite of what the OLI-paradigm conjectures. 
 The point to note here is that when the MNE adheres to the relationships implied by 
the OLI-paradigm in Figure 1, it will transfer more knowledge abroad as its degree of FDI- 
ownership increases (Figure 1b). This is because, while (possibly) recognizing the level of 
control-effect, it disregards the channel variety-effect. Yet if the true relationship is the one 
we conjecture in Figure 2 (i.e. including the channel variety-effect), this implies that the MNE 
should actually transfer less knowledge abroad, since up to a certain extent (I') spillover 
potential is increasing. Consequently, the MNE is thus actually increasing spillover potential 
at first when it moves from exports to FDI. Moreover, as it is simultaneously transferring 
more knowledge abroad, this in turn stimulates actual spillovers since there is more 
knowledge to spill over. The OLI-paradox thus unfolds itself: Having more firm specific 
Integration I' 
SS 
Spillover 
Potential 
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knowledge, a firm is more likely to engage in FDI in order to prevent knowledge spillovers, 
whereas it is thus actually stimulating them (up to a certain extent I'). 
 Obviously, the precise position and curvature of the SS-curve depends on the precise 
number and nature of the underlying spillover transfer channels. If these indeed have different 
weights attached to them (and we expect that they do), then the curve may become steeper or 
flatter and I' may shift to the left or right. The way we have drawn it in the figure is just to 
illustrate that it will typically be of a non-linear, non-monotone nature 
Moreover, we note that a high level of transferred knowledge and high spillover 
potential (the combination of which reaches a maximum at I') does not automatically imply 
that the actual knowledge spillovers are high as well. In line with our discussion in the 
previous section, we argue that this also depends on the absorption capacity of the recipient. 
The local (partner) firm(s) has to have some stock of knowledge itself to be able to absorb 
knowledge spillover from the MNE. Hence, next to a high potential for knowledge spillovers, 
the extent of the actual spillovers also depends on the degree of knowledge embodied in the 
FDI relative to the degree of knowledge present in the local (partner) firm(s). We will refer to 
this as the technological distance between the investor and recipient. In the formal model we 
develop in the next section, it will play a central role. 
We conclude our exposition of how ownership relates to knowledge spillovers by 
discussing the role geography plays. Surely, spatiality has been at the heart of our analysis all 
over, as we consider FDI. However, so far we have taken the location decision of the MNE as 
given, since the focus has been on the level of ownership. We note, however, that the OLI-
paradigm also stresses location as an important motivation for FDI. We have already noted 
that previous literature has argued that FDI-related knowledge spillovers have a crucial 
geographical dimension (see Table 1). Hence, if knowledge spillovers are indeed spatially 
bounded, the basis for the OLI-paradox is strengthened.16 Accordingly, any theory or 
empirical test of the OLI-paradox should take account of geography. Theoretically, we see 
prospects here for applying insights and modeling techniques of geographical economics. 
This is especially relevant if one realizes that the spatiality of knowledge spillovers is 
typically understood to mean that they most likely appear in economic clusters.  
  
 
 
                                                
16
 Evidence for the spatiality of knowledge spillovers is rather mixed however (see e.g. Jaffe et al., 1993; 
Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Cornish, 1997; Girma and Wakelin, 2002).  
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4. A formal model of FDI and knowledge spillovers 
 
The previous section provides the basic building blocks for a coherent theory of knowledge 
spillovers related to FDI. Such a theory should take account of the level of control-effect and 
at the same time recognize how this induces the channel variety-effect. It also should take 
account of the fact that turning knowledge spillover potential into an actual knowledge 
spillover has something to do with the absorptive capacity of the recipient (technological 
distance). Moreover, if knowledge spillovers are indeed spatially bounded, these processes 
have to be modeled as well. 
In this section we take the first steps in constructing such a theory. Our analysis will 
be far from complete and therefore, at this point, merely serves to illustrate how the insights 
of the previous section can be formalized. It should be noted that a formal model concerning 
the extent of knowledge spillovers is not novel (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Eaton and 
Kortum, 1999). However, previous efforts in this area of research have mainly sufficed by 
introducing some kind of knowledge diffusion parameter, sayϕ . Very generally, knowledge 
diffusion is then modeled as: 
  
    jiKKK tj
s
t
titi ≠+= +
=
+ ∑  s.t.    1,
0
,1, ϕ         [3] 
 
Here, K denotes the stock of knowledge. Hence, a country's (i) stock of knowledge at time 
t+1 depends on its accumulated stock over the past and some amount of knowledge that is 
spilled over from abroad (j) at rate ϕ. Accordingly, ϕ is either assumed to be exogenously 
determined or to be randomly drawn from some specific probability distribution. Although it 
is mostly acknowledged that ϕ must be determined endogenously, the issue is never explored 
further. The novel contribution of our model lies in the fact that we aim to do so.17 We seek to 
find out how ϕ is determined by (a) allowing for the level of control-effect, while (b) 
                                                
17
 Although the parallel with the endogenous growth literature is easily made, there is a slight difference. The 
endogenous growth literature endogenizes technological change by making it the aim of purposeful action by 
economic agents.  In the case of knowledge spillovers, we have to slightly alter this notion in that it is probably 
not the aim of any economic agent to (purposefully) spill over firm-specific knowledge. Rather, we will argue 
that knowledge spillovers are a consequence (not an aim) of purposeful action, specifically resulting from 
conscious choices regarding degree of FDI-ownership and transferred knowledge.  
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recognizing the channel variety-effect and (c) acknowledging that it is actually technological 
distance that eventually determines actual knowledge spillovers.18 
 Consider Figure 3 below which shows a unit circle, (i.e. a circle that covers a distance 
of 1). The circle represents technological space and the starting point (i.e. 0) is arbitrary. The 
numbers Nn ,..,1= are potential partner firms in the foreign economy, whereas Mm ,..,1= are 
the possible locations at which the MNE may enter technology space. Note that the locations 
of both local firms and the MNE represent technological states. Now, if we denote such a 
technological state by xi - where subscript i denotes the MNE and subscript j denotes an 
arbitrary local firm - )( ji xxx −= thus denotes technological distance. We assume throughout 
that jx is given, so that x can only be varied by varying ix .
19
 This translates into Figure 3 by 
assuming that the positions of n are fixed whereas m is flexible. Accordingly, the distance 
between two local firms (1/n) can be thought of as a measure of average absorption capacity. 
This may be influenced by general knowledge characteristics, market structure and/or 
government policy. Hence, the situation as shown in Figure 3 is a result of such forces and 
thus provides a scope for general equilibrium analysis. 20  
 
 
Figure 3: Technological distance on the unit circle  
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 Thus note that (a) and (b) together indirectly determine actual spillovers through spillover potential, whereas 
(c) directly determines actual spillovers. 
19
 This may seem to be a rather restrictive assumption. However, we are interested in MNE behavior and FDI 
spillover potential. Hence, we are modeling from the MNE's point of view. Since the MNE will be able only to 
influence xi, the assumption is not implausible. 
20
 The construct of the model proposed here is based on Grossman and Helpman (2002a;2002b), although these 
authors apply it as a model for outsourcing vs. FDI decisions.  
1
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Our model implies two other assumptions that we should highlight: first, we assume 
that the local firms are located at equal distances (1/n) from each other in order to keep the 
model tractable. Second, note that an MNE, by construction of the model, always locates 
somewhere in-between two local firms (assuming n ≥ 2). However, we assume that all firms 
are technologically equal (i.e. different locations on the unit circle are not assigned different 
cardinal values) and that technological distance (x) is defined with respect to the local firm 
that is closest to the MNE (so that the remaining distance is 1/n - x).     
We seek to model knowledge spillovers (S) as a function of spillover potential (by 
combining the level of control-effect and channel variety-effect in g(I)) and of technological 
distance x: 
 
    ))(),(( xhIgFS =           [4] 
 
Let us start by specifying h(x), which gives the direct relationship between S and x. The 
absorptive capacity discussion leads us to believe that there is a hump-back shaped 
relationship between S and x: if x is too small, both firms are technologically very similar and 
hence spillovers are small as well (since there is not much to learn). However, if x is too large, 
the local firm has too few technological means to absorb spillovers so that spillovers are small 
again. The following formulation respects these conditions: 
 
    
n
x
xxh +−= 22)(           [5] 
 
The first term in [5] simply denotes the double negative squared value of technological 
distance between the MNE and the local firm, whereas the second term denotes the 
technological distance between the MNE and a local firm, relative to the total distance 
between two local firms.  
The second relationship we model is that between S and I as given by g(I) in [4]. Let 
us define I as follows: 
 
    
ji
i
ff
fI
+
≡
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Here fi denotes the amount of investment by firm i in the foreign operation, where we again 
assume that i represents the MNE and j an arbitrary local firm. Different types of FDI are 
hence defined in terms of alternative degrees of integration, which takes care of the level of 
control-effect. As shown in Figure 1b and discussed in the previous section, the view is 
commonly held (at least by the MNE) that there is a positive relationship between xi (the 
amount of knowledge transferred from MNE HQ to its subsidiary) and I. But 
since )( ji xxx −= and we have fixed xj, this implies that there is a positive relationship 
between x and I as well. We assume – like the MNE – that this relationship is linear and 
denoted by: 
 
     xnI 2=       
                   
Note that this formulation respects the fact that the maximum value of I =1. Recall from the 
previous section that the channel variety-effect states that spillover potential g(I) is non-
linearly related to ownership. In our discussion of Figure 2 we attached equal weights to all 
spillover transfer channels. Here we will make a similar simplification by assuming a 
symmetric quadratic relationship between spillover potential and the level of integration: 
 
            IIIg +−= 2)(           [6] 
 
Now, if we recognize that actual spillovers S are positively related to spillover potential g(I), 
combining [5] and [6], while scaling down the latter by 4n2, implies that [4] becomes: 
 
                       
n
x
xS
2
33 2 +−=                                 [7] 
 
From [7] we can calculate the value of x at which spillovers are greatest (x'): 
 
                 
n
x
4
1
'=                      [8] 
 
Now, the decision of the MNE concerning what type of FDI is optimal for investing abroad 
obviously does not depend solely on spillovers: we need a formulation for profits as well, 
 17 
preferably in terms of x. We assume at this point that the relationship between (joint) profits 
(pi) and technological distance is positive and linear:21  
           
n
x
=pi          [9a] 
 
Hence joint profits are determined by the technological distance between the MNE and the 
local firm relative to the total distance between two local firms. MNE profits are then given 
by: 
 
               cxc
n
xIMNE −=−





=
22pi                                [9b] 
 
Here, c denotes some amount of sunk costs which are always incurred by the MNE when 
investing abroad.22 Comparing [9b] with [7] allows us to derive the values of x (and I) for 
which spillovers equal MNE profits. Note that this implies that we consider knowledge 
spillovers as a cost for the MNE, since we directly relate them to profits. The costs of 
spillovers can be thought of as a loss in ownership advantages, which damages the MNE's 
competitiveness.23 Hence we are able to define those values of x – and I – for which MNE 
profits are larger than spillovers. Proceeding in this fashion (and disregarding the theoretically 
irrelevant case at which 0ˆ <x ) we obtain: 
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                             [10]  
 
Hence, when xx ˆ> (or equivalently, when nxII ˆ2ˆ => ), MNE profits are greater than 
spillovers. Accordingly, the MNE will choose to invest abroad only at a level of integration 
                                                
21
 The intuition behind this assumption is that as technological distance between the MNE and the local firm 
increases, the complementarity of their technologies increases as well, allowing for larger cooperative gains.  
22
 Here we assume that sunk costs are incurred by the MNE only whereas the remainder of the joint profits is 
shared proportionally to degree of ownership. 
23
 Alternatively, one may argue that knowledge spillovers cannot be interpreted as (nominal) costs. Accordingly, 
it would not be possible to relate them to profits. We may then set marginal spillovers equal to marginal profits 
in order to derive the optimal technological distance. 
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of II ˆ> .24 Note that [10] thus gives us an (implicit) function of the degree of integration, 
where spillover potential is endogenous. Note that the critical value Iˆ (the degree of 
integration after which the MNE will choose to invest abroad) is positively dependent on sunk 
costs (c) and the number of local firms (n).  
As our model is still far from complete we will postpone an in-depth analysis of its 
implications for the moment. In stead we provide a numerical simulation in the Appendix of 
this paper in order to further clarify matters. As argued, the relationship between spillover 
potential and integration g(I) is non-linear due to the channel variety-effect. However, we 
have assumed that it is symmetric around some mean (in this case 0.5), disregarding the 
potential different weights attached to the different numbers and varieties of spillover 
channels. Hence on further aim of our analysis is to extend our model along this line. 
Another aim is to embed the spillover model in a general equilibrium framework. As 
we have already noted, the set-up of the model as depicted in Figure 3 is itself a result of GE 
modeling, examples of which can be found in the geographical economics literature. 
Moreover, by incorporating the spillover model in more formal theories of the MNE (e.g. 
Ethier and Markusen, 1996) we will be able to more formally derive the conditions under 
which the OLI-paradox holds. All these extensions are part of our current research agenda.    
 
5. Empirical research 
 
So far we have discussed mainly conceptual issues on FDI-related knowledge spillovers. 
However, there is a large and ever growing strand of empirical research on the subject, which 
may lead the reader to question most of what has been discussed above. If indeed empirical 
research on this subject is so wide-spread, has the OLI-paradox not been addressed and 
established already? Is the theoretical framework on which existing empirical literature 
frames itself not sufficient? Are we really in need of a(nother) theoretical model? We will 
show in this section that although these questions are valid, the empirical literature thus far 
has been largely ignoring the issues that we have raised in the previous sections. 
 The empirical estimation function that is often encountered in the spillover literature 
has the following generic form (using matrix-vector notation): 
 
                                                
24
 By combining [10] and [8] we can derive for what value(s) of c the MNE will choose to invest abroad albeit 
spillover potential being at its maximum. It turns out that this is the case when c=-1/16n2, i.e. if a local 
government wants to maximize spillover potential, it should subsidize the MNE by an amount of c + 1/16n2. 
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    εDZXcγ ++++= βα        [11]
  
Here γ denotes productivity25, c is a constant, X is a matrix of standard control variables (e.g. 
investments in R&D, Human Capital and (more recently) trade), Z is the variable of interest 
and D are time/cross-section dummies. In the FDI-related knowledge spillover literature, Z is 
thus the amount of (inward and/or outward) FDI.26  
Equation [11] shows the usual estimating strategy. This type of empirical model is 
encountered at all levels of analysis, i.e. national (e.g. Coe and Helpman, 1995; Lichtenberg 
and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 1996;1998), sectoral (e.g. Braconier et al. 2001; 
Sjöholm, 1997; Barrell and Pain, 1999; Verspagen, 1997), firm (e.g. Aitken and Harrison, 
1999; Keller and Yeaple, 2003; Branstetter, 2000) and regional (e.g. Audretsch and Feldman, 
1996; Cornish, 1997; Haskel et al., 2002).27  
The first point to note is that in the FDI-related knowledge spillover literature, the 
variable Z is the total amount of FDI in either stocks or flows, from country i ∈ N into 
country j (s.t. j ≠ i).28  Hence, any effect that is left after controlling for the most obvious 
determinants of productivity is ascribed to FDI (cf. Görg and Greenaway, 2004). Apart from 
the fact that this approach is rather crude, a more fundamental problem lies in the fact that the 
coefficient β eventually measures some roughly aggregated effect of FDI on productivity. For 
instance, although direct (composition) effects of FDI are sometimes controlled for, this is 
certainly not always the case.  
If we confront this empirical strategy with our discussion in section 3 (and 4), two 
observations arise. First of all, whereas we have – based on previous theoretical efforts – 
deducted and established that the type of FDI is of prime importance for establishing its 
                                                
25
 This is usually taken to be either Total Factor Productivity (TFP) or Labor Productivity (LP). 
26
 Inward FDI is expected to influence TFP because foreign MNEs will want to exploit their technological 
advantage in the host country ("technology exploiting FDI"), so that spillovers may occur. Outward FDI is 
expected to influence home country TFP because the MNE may locate abroad to learn from foreign technology 
("technology sourcing FDI"). It should be clear immediately that both sourcing and exploiting motives may 
underlie both types of FDI, so that it is not obvious a priori whether FDI has a positive influence on home or 
host country TFP (also see e.g. Criscuolo et al. (2002) or Narula and Zanfei (2005) for related discussions).  
27
 For some excellent surveys on the empirical (FDI-related) knowledge spillovers literature, the reader is 
referred to, inter alia, Cincera and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2001), Grünfeld (2002a), Keller (2004), 
Görg and Greenaway (2004) and Hoppe (2005). 
28
 There has been a long-standing debate in the FDI-related knowledge spillover literature whether stock or flow 
data of FDI should be used. Those in favor of the former argue that knowledge embodied in FDI accumulates 
over time, so that stocks more accurately reflect the total amount of accumulated knowledge embodied in FDI 
(usually the perpetual inventory method is applied). Those in favor of flow data argue that stock data suffer from 
serious stationarity problems so that they will bias the estimated coefficients. Hence the former view is mainly 
based on conceptual considerations whereas the latter is more methodologically founded.  
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spillover potential, no such distinction is made in the empirical spillover literature.29 I.e. the 
empirical literature has largely disregarded the level of control-effect. Hence, regardless of the 
sign and magnitude of β, we cannot infer anything about the spillover effects of specific types 
of FDI. Note that this also impedes proper policy recommendations beyond very general ones 
about whether or not FDI is beneficial in terms of knowledge spillovers de facto.  
A second point of concern is that the coefficient β not only very crudely measures net 
spillover effects from total FDI, it also does not allow us to infer anything about specific 
spillover transfer channels. I.e. the empirical estimation strategy as given by [11] simply 
assumes that the theoretically distinguished spillover transfer channels function as such.  
Consequently, any measured spillover effect must be going through any or all of these transfer 
channels. The question of the validity of these transfer channels and whether or not there are 
more that we have overlooked thus remains unanswered.30 This implies that the channel 
variety-effect has not been addressed by the empirical literature either. Again this impedes 
proper policy recommendations as we are not able to identify the exact workings of 
knowledge spillovers. 
Although these objections may seem valid based on the discussion in section 3, this 
discussion itself is to some extent subjective as it is based on personal (and thus maybe 
arbitrary) observations. We thus may ask how the results of the empirical research efforts hold 
up compared to each other. The answer is: not too well.31 A large number of empirical studies 
have set-out to measure spillovers from FDI and the evidence ranges from positive spillovers 
(e.g. Keller and Yeaple, 2003; Kinoshita, 2000; Barba Navaretti and Castellani, 2003), to no 
spillovers (e.g. Braconier et al., 2001; Veugelers and Cassiman, 2004; Cornish, 1997) to even 
negative spillovers (Aitken and Harrison, 1999). According to Görg and Strobl (2001), this 
large variety in results has three main causes: (1) different levels of analysis, (2) cross-section 
versus panel data analysis, and (3) different measures of spillovers. They even argue that the 
number of studies finding 'evidence' of spillovers is approximately as high as cases where no 
significant results are obtained. Narula and Zanfei (2005) implicitly argue that most evidence 
in favor of the existence of spillovers is found in developed-county studies, whereas studies 
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 Two notable exceptions are Belderbos et al. (2001) and Javorcik (2004). These authors indeed distinguish 
between different types of FDI in terms of MNE-ownership and find that there is a relationship between type of 
FDI and knowledge spillovers.  
30
 Again, one notable exception here is Belderbos et al. (2001). These authors specifically investigate the extent 
of knowledge spillovers through vertical linkages.  
31
 Barba Navaretti and Venables (2004, Ch. 7) present an elegant discussion of the ambiguity in empirical results 
on FDI-related knowledge spillovers. Specifically Table 7.5 (p.177) is illuminating.  Also see Table 2 (p.177-
178) in Görg and Greenaway (2004) for a more elaborate exposition.  
 21 
for developing countries do not point to significant spillovers. Explanations for the lack of 
consistency in empirical results have thus been claimed to be mainly of an empirically 
methodological nature. 
Based on the above however, we would like to argue that the problem that is plaguing 
empirical modeling efforts of FDI-related knowledge spillovers is more fundamental. Our 
main objection is that the empirical literature disregards the fact that FDI comprises a large 
variety of different types of investments. Consequently, the empirical literature goes past the 
specific spillover transfer channels. Referring back to sections 2 and 3 we can summarize 
these objections by noting that the empirical literature fails to take proper account of the 
theoretical validation of the existence of FDI-related knowledge spillovers. What has been 
lacking thus far is a coherent general framework in which empirical modeling efforts are 
embedded. As we have argued, a consequence of this current state of affairs has been an 
inability to make proper policy recommendations. Not only because of the lack in consistent 
empirical results, but also because the results have been far too general to warrant policy 
inference. Moreover, the missing underlying framework has largely impeded proper 
comparison of different strands of research.  
We are thus in need of a general and coherent framework that enables proper 
empirical modeling of knowledge spillovers by being firmly established in theoretical and 
conceptual notions. In our view, the framework proposed in sections 3 and 4 provides a first 
step in fulfilling this need. From a theoretical point of view, our model will be useful for 
generating testable hypothesis concerning the spillover potential of different types of FDI 
through specific spillover transfer channels. Empirically, it may serve as a general construct 
that provides a guide-line as to what relationships and hypotheses are relevant for testing. 
 
6. Conclusion and research agenda 
 
This paper has reviewed the main conceptual and theoretical issues surrounding knowledge 
spillovers, specifically with respect to FDI. Based on these issues it has established a coherent 
framework of analyzing knowledge spillovers related to FDI. An important observation in this 
respect has been that a coherent theory of FDI-related knowledge spillovers should recognize 
that there are many different types of FDI, which we have termed the level of control-effect. 
Different types of FDI in turn may yield different degrees of spillover potential. This process 
runs mainly through the channel variety-effect, which states that different types of FDI are 
related to a different number and nature of spillover transfer channels. We have then argued 
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that the combination of these two effects lies at the heart of the OLI-paradox as they 
determine the total spillover potential of different types of FDI. With respect to actual 
knowledge spillovers, we have argued that these are determined both by spillover potential 
and by technological distance. We define technological distance as the amount of knowledge 
transferred to the MNE's subsidiary, relative to that of recipient (partner) firms. Subsequently 
we have presented a preliminary model for modeling knowledge spillover potential of FDI. 
This model shows, inter alia, that the investment choice of the MNE is determined by profits 
and spillover-costs simultaneously and that the optimal degree of ownership is positively 
related to potential local partner firms and sunk costs. Finally, it has been shown that the 
empirical literature thus far fails to tackle the key issues that we address in our framework. In 
our opinion this implies a lack of theoretical foundation which we believe is the main cause 
for the lack of consistency in results. An important consequence of this state of affairs is that 
it has impeded proper and specific policy inference, as well as valid cross-comparison of the 
empirical research. 
 The eventual aim of our research agenda is to properly assess the extent and potential 
of FDI-related knowledge spillovers empirically. The first step in this process is the model we 
introduced in section 4. However, as we have stated this is far from complete. For instance, it 
does not incorporate weighted channel variety-effects. But also, and more importantly, we 
would like to embed our framework in a full-fledged theory of the MNE. That is, including 
the why, how and where decision of foreign operations. The geographical economics 
literature may provide useful modeling tools in this respect.  
 In order to test the hypotheses that can be derived from the model however, we 
conjecture that the data that are presently used in empirical research are not sufficient. More 
specifically, we believe that we are in need of survey-data from MNEs.32 Such data should be 
able to specifically address the relationship between different types of FDI and specific 
spillover transfer channels. In light of this, not only should MNEs and their foreign 
subsidiaries be surveyed, but also matched surveys might be conducted among competitors or 
supplier- and customer-networks of MNEs. Although innovation surveys are already 
conducted at regular intervals (e.g. the Community Innovation Survey), these surveys do not 
allow for specific spillover analysis as they focus mainly on input and output of the 
innovation process. Moreover, there is no explicit focus on MNEs. Accordingly, a next step in 
                                                
32
 Economists are in general not very fond of survey-data since mostly they do not allow for the much desired 
generalizations of results - unless the survey can be conducted at some very large critical scale. However, using 
MNE survey data to measure technology transfer is certainly not novel (e.g. Teece, 1977), nor is the suggestion 
of doing so (e.g. Sharma, 1998, p.897).  
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our modeling efforts of FDI-related spillovers is to conduct such a survey. Currently we are 
aiming to establish contacts with (Dutch) MNEs in order to secure the possibility of an 
empirical test in an early stadium of our research.  
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Appendix33 
 
We take the case as denoted in Figure 3, where n = 6. From this it follows that [7] becomes: 
 
    
12
33 2 xxS +−=          [7]’ 
 
[7]’ thus gives us the function of spillover potential. Applying [9b] yields a function of MNE 
profits. In order to specify [9b] however, we need a value for c. In order to preserve the proper 
scale, let us set c to 1/500. This yields the MNE profit function: 
 
    
500
12 2 −= xMNEpi         [9b]' 
 
The graphs belonging to these functions for the specific parameter values are shown below in 
Figure A1. The SS-curve denotes the spillover potential function, whereas the PP-curve 
denotes the MNE profit function. 
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Figure A1: Spillover Potential (n=6) 
                                                
33
 The numerical values that result from the equations for pi and S may seem unrealistic. Note that this is due to 
the fact that we normalize total technological distance to the interval [0,1]. The reader may verify that by 
normalizing the distance between two local firms (1/n) to 1, similar results are obtained albeit the numerical 
values become somewhat larger. However, since the parameter n disappears from the equations we prefer our 
original specification as this enables us to analyze the effects of an change in n on the variables. 
PP 
SS 
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From this figure and from [8] and [10] we can derive that spillover potential is largest 
at I = 0.5, SME profits are smallest at I = 0 and the critical value I’ after which the MNE finds 
it profitable to invest abroad is +/- 0.67. Also note that due to fixed costs, MNE profits only 
become positive as  from I ≈ 0.37. It thus follows that due to knowledge spillovers, positive 
profits are not a sufficient condition for investing abroad. Also note that if the government of 
the foreign economy wants to maximize spillovers, it should subsidize the MNE's investment 
by an amount of c + 1/16n2 (footnote 24) which in our example thus amounts to +/- 0.004. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
